Ethics, economic organization and the social contract

Handbook of Economic Organization: Integrating Economic and Organization Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 112-136

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879762072     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781782548225.00015     Document Type: Chapter

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