The constitution of the not-for-profit organisation: Reciprocal conformity to morality

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 249-276

  Grimalda, Gianluca ^a   Sacconi, Lorenzo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Conformism; Ideology; Non profit; Non self interested motivations; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844524521     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2833-2     Document Type: Article

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