A Rawlsian view of CSR and the game theory of its implementation (III): Conformism, equilibrium refinement and selection

Social Capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Behaviour and Performance

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 42-79

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84999232266     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230306189     Document Type: Chapter

References (45)

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