A social contract account for CSR as an extended model of corporate governance (II): Compliance, reputation and reciprocity

Journal of Business Ethics

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 77-96

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

^c Department of Economics ^*

Author keywords

Conformist preferences; Ethical norms; Fuzzy logic and default reasoning; Reciprocity and fairness; Reputation games; Self regulation; Unforeseen contingencies

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548270407     PISSN: 01674544     EISSN: 15730697     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10551-006-9239-6     Document Type: Article

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