Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: The experimental evidence

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 171-201

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a,b   Faillo, Marco ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Conformist preferences; Experiments; Fairness; Psychological games; Reciprocity; Veil of ignorance

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953019964     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-009-9080-x     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Bacharach, M. (1994). The epistemic structure of a game. Theory and Decisions, 37, 7-48.
2. Bacharach, M. (2006). Beyond individual choice: Teams and frames in game theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
3. Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2007). Guilt in games. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 97, 170-176.
4. Bicchieri, C. (2006). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Binmore, K. (1998). Game theory and the social contract, vol. 2: Just playing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6. Binmore, K. (2005). Natural justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74, 1579-1601.
8. Cubitt, R., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1998). On the validity of the random lottery incentive system. Experimental Economics, 1, 115-131.
9. Dufwenberg, M. (2008). Psychological games. In S. N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume (Eds.), The new Palgrave dictionary of economics (2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
10. Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2004). Promises, threats and fairness. The Economic Journal, 114, 397-420.
11. Faillo, M., & Sacconi, L. (2007). Norm compliance: The contribution of behavioral economics theories. In A. Innocenti & P. Sbriglia (Eds.), Games, rationality and behaviour, essays in behavioural game theory and experiments. London: Palgrave-MacMillan.
12. Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 293-315.
13. Farrel, J., & Rabin, M. (1996). Cheap talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(3), 103-108.
14. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and co-operation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
15. Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1989). Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60-79.
16. Grimalda, G., & Sacconi, L. (2002). The constitution of the no profit enterprise, ideals, conformism and reciprocity. University Carlo Cattaneo-LIUC paper n. 155.
17. Grimalda, G., & Sacconi, L. (2005). The constitution of the not-for-profit organization: Reciprocal conformity to morality. Constitutional Political Economy, 16(3), 249-276.
18. Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiment. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(3), 593-622.
19. Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
20. Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302.
21. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Reiter, R. (1980). A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13, 81-132.
23. Sacconi, L. (2000). The social contract of the firm: Economics, ethics and organisation. Springer.
24. Sacconi, L., & Faillo, M. (2005). Conformity and reciprocity in the "Exclusion Game": An experimental investigation. Discussion Paper No. 12/05. Department of Economics University of Trento.
25. Sacconi, L., & Grimalda, G. (2007). Ideals, conformism and reciprocity: A model of individual choice with conformist motivations, and an application to the not-for-profit case. In L. Bruni & P. L. Porta (Eds.), Handbook of happiness in economics. London: Edward Elgar.
26. Sacconi, L., & Moretti, S. (2008). A fuzzy logic and default reasoning model of social norms and eqiulibrium selection in games under unforeseen contingencies. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems, 16(1), 59-81.
27. Siegel, S., & Castellan, N. J. (1988). Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences. New York: McGraw-Hill.
28. Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1991). Does the random-lottery incentive system elicit true preferences? An experimental investigation. American Economic Review, 81, 971-978.
29. Vanberg, C. (2008). Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two explanations. Econometrica, 76, 1467-1480.