Managers' double fiduciary duty: To stakeholders and to freedom

Business Ethics Quarterly

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 189-214

  Kaufman, Allen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036328709     PISSN: 1052150X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/10.2307/3857810     Document Type: Article

References (131)

1. Social responsibility and economic efficiency
2. Does the prudent investor need the uniform prudent investor act - An empirical study of trust investment practices
3. The economics of a free society: A declaration of american economic policy
4. The core fiduciary duties of outside directors
5. A team production theory of corporate law
6. Does business ethics rest on a mistake
7. Self-regulation, normative choice, and the structure of corporate fiduciary law
8. The 1980 earthquake: Realignment, reaction or what?
9. Business roundtable
10. The folklore of investor capitalism
11. Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate monitor
12. For whom are corporate managers trustees
13. Are business managers 'professionals'?
14. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence and implications
15. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
16. The separation of ownership from control
17. The U.S.A.: The permanent revolution
18. Property rights and economic theory: A survey of recent literature
19. Reinventing the outside director: An agenda for institutional investors
20. Santa clara revisited: The development of corporate theory
21. New financial products, the modern process of financial innovation, and the puzzle of shareholder welfare
22. Human development report
23. Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of economics and ethics
24. Profit sharing and gainsharing: A review of theory, incidence, and effects
25. Collaboration and technology linkages: A strategic supplier typology
26. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and the restructuring of American capitalism
27. From trust to contract: The legal language of managerial ideology, 1920-1980
28. The human nature of corporate boards: Law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and accountability
29. Rank order tournaments as optimum labor contracts
30. Rhetoric and reality: Making sense of the income gap debate
31. Fiduciary duties as residual claims: Obligations to nonshareholder constituencies from a theory of the firm perspective
32. 'The higher criticism' of the modern corporation
33. Mergers and the market for corporate control
34. Self-regulation and social welfare: Political economy of corporate environmentalism
35. The twilight of fiduciary duties: On the need for share-holder self-help in an age of formalistic proceduralism
36. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
37. Reflections on the corporation as a social institution
38. Private law, public interest? The ALI principles of corporate governance
39. Trust and team production in post-capitalist society
40. Executive compensation
41. Restructuring the corporation's nexus of contracts: Recognizing a fiduciary duty to protect displaced workers
42. The promise of the governed corporation
43. Symposium trust relationships Part 2 of 2: Law v. trust
44. The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem
45. The moral standing of the market
46. Codes of conduct for global business: Prospects and challenges for implementation
47. The efficient norm for corporate law: A neotraditional interpretation of fiduciary duty
48. Institutions and entrepreneurs in American corporate finance
49. Corporate governance
50. Towards a bargaining theory of the firm
51. Why businessmen distrust their state: The political consciousness of American business executives
52. Dedication address
53. Repaving the brandies way: The decline of developmental property