Contractarian compliance and the 'sense of justice': A behavioral conformity model and its experimental support

Analyse und Kritik

Volumn 2011, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 271-310

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a   Faillo, Marco ^a   Ottone, Stefania ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864787492     PISSN: 01715860     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/auk-2011-0120     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Andreozzi L. (2010), When Reputation Is Not Enough: Justifying Corporate Social Responsibility, in: Sacconi, L./M. Blair/R. E. Freeman/A. Vercelli (eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines, Basingstoke, 253-271
2. Aoki M. (2001), Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge/MA
3. Bacharach, M. (1994), The Epistemic Structure of a Game, in: Theory and Decisions 37, 7-48
4. Bacharach, M. (2006), Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory, Princeton
5. Bicchieri, C. (2006), The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge
6. Binmore K. (1989), The Social Contract: Harsanyi and Rawls, in: Economic Journal 99, 84-106
7. Binmore K. (1994), Game Theory and the Social Contract, vol. I, Playing Fair, Cambridge/MA
8. Binmore K. (1997), Game Theory and the Social Contract, vol. II, Just Playing, Cambridge/MA
9. Binmore K. (2005), Natural Justice, Oxford
10. Binmore K./A. Brandenburger (1990), Common Knowledge and Game Theory, in: Essays on the Foundation of Game Theory (ed. by K. Binmore), Oxford, 105-150
11. Bolton, G. E. (1991), A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence, in: American Economic Review 81, 1096-1136
12. Bolton, G. E. /A. Ockenfels (2000), A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition, in: American Economic Review 100, 166-193
13. Buchanan J. (1975), The Limits of Liberty, Chicago
14. Cubitt, R./C. Starmer/R. Sugden (1998), On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System, in: Experimental Economics 1, 115-131
15. Danielson, P. (1992), Artificial Morality, Virtuous Robot for Virtual Games, London
16. Davis, D. D./C A. Holt (1993), Experimental Economics, Princeton
17. Fagin, R./J- Y. Halpern/Y. Moses/M. Y. Vardi (1996), Reasoning about Knowledge, Cambridge MA
18. Faillo, M./L. Sacconi (2007), Norm Compliance: The Contribution of Behavioral Economics Theories, in: Innocenti, A./P. Sbriglia (eds.), Games, Rationality and Behaviour, Essays in Behavioural Game Theory and Experiments, London, 101-133
19. Faillo, M./S. Ottone/L. Sacconi (2008), Compliance by Believing: An Experimental Exploration on Social Norms and Impartial Agreements, working paper N. 10/2008 del Dipartimento di economia dell'Universita di Trento, URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1151245
20. Falk, A./U. Fischbacher (2001), A Theory of Reciprocity, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 6
21. Fehr, E./K. M. Schmidt (1999), A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Co-operation, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868
22. Gauthier, D. (1986), Morals by Agreement, Oxford
23. Gauthier, D. (1990), Economic Man and the Rational Reasoner, in: Nicols, J. H./C. Wright (eds.), From Political Economy to Economics-and Back?, San Francisco, 105-131
24. Gauthier, D. (1994), Commitment and Choice: An Essay on the Rationality of Plans, in: Farina, F./S. Vannucci/F. Hahn (eds.), Ethics, Rationality, Economic Behavior, Oxford, 217-245
25. Geanakoplos, J./D. Pearce/E. Stacchetti (1989), Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, in: Games and Economic Behavior 1, 60-79
26. Grimalda, G./L. Sacconi (2002), The Constitution of the No Profit Enterprise, Ideals, Conformism and Reciprocity, University Carlo Cattaneo-LIUC paper n. 155
27. Geanakoplos, J. (2005), The Constitution of the Not-for-Profit Organization: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality, in: Constitutional Political Economy 16(3), 249-276
28. Hampton J. (1986), Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge
29. Harsanyi, J. C./R. Selten (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection, Cambridge/MA
30. Hume D. (2000[1740]), A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford
31. Kreps D. (1990), Games and Economic Modelling, Cambridge
32. Levine, D. K. (1998), Modelling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, in: Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 593-622
33. Lewis D. (1969), Conventions. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA
34. Luce R. D./H. Raiffa (1957), Games and Decisions, New York
35. McClennen, E. (1990), Foundational Exploration for an Normative Theory of Political Economy, in: Constitutional Political Economy 1(1), 67-99
36. McClennen, E. (1990a), Rationality and Dynamic Choice, Cambridge
37. McClennen, E. (1993), Rationality Constitutions and the Ethics of Rules, in: Constitutional Political Economy 4(2), 94-118
38. Nagel, T. (1986), A View from Nowhere, Oxford
39. Rabin, M. (1993), Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, in: American Economic Review 83(5), 1281-1302
40. Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Oxford
41. Rawls, J. (1993), Political Liberalism, Cambridge/MA
42. Reiter, R. (1980), A Logic for Default Reasoning, in: Artificial Intelligence 13, 81-132
43. Sacconi, L./M. Faillo (2005), Conformity and Reciprocity in the 'Exclusion Game': An Experimental Investigation, Discussion Paper No. 12/05, Department of Economics University of Trento
44. Sacconi, L./M. Faillo (2010), Conformity, Reciprocity and the Sense of Justice. How Social Contract-based Preferences and Beliefs Explain Norm Compliance: The Experimental Evidence, in: Constitutional Political Economy 21(2), 171-201
45. Sacconi, L./G. Grimalda (2007), Ideals, Conformism and Reciprocity: A Model of Individual Choice with Conformist Motivations, and an Application to the Not-for-Profit Case, in: Bruni, L./P. L. Porta (eds.), Handbook of Happiness in Economics, London
46. Sacconi, L./S. Moretti (2008), A Fuzzy Logic and Default Reasoning Model of Social Norms and Equilibrium Selection in Games under Unforeseen Contingencies, in: International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge Based Systems 16(1), 59-81
47. Sacconi, L. (1991), Etica degli affari, Milano
48. Sacconi, L. (1993), Equilibrio e giustizia (I): la stabilita del contratto sociale, in: // giornale degli economist!, 52(10-12), 479-528
49. Sacconi, L. (1993a), Equilibrio e giustizia (II): la selezione del contratto sociale, in: // giornale degli economist! 52(10-12), 529-575
50. Sacconi, L. (2000), The Social Contract of the Firm, Berlin
51. Sacconi, L. (2010), A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of Its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium, in: Sacconi, L./M. Blair/R. E. Freeman/A. Vercelli (eds.), Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines, Basingstoke, 194-252
52. Sacconi, L. (2011), A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part III): Conformism, Equilibrium Refinements and Selection, in: Social Capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Behavior and Performance, edited by L. Sacconi/G. Degli Antoni, Basingstoke, 42-79
53. Skyrms B. (1996), Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge
54. Starmer, C./R. Sugden (1991), Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation, in: American Economic Review 81, 971-978
55. Sugden, R. (1986), The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, London-Blackwell
56. Sugden, R. (1998), Conventions, in: The Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, (ed. by P. Newman), Basingstoke
57. Sugden, R. (1998a), Normative Expectation, in: Ben Ner, A./L. Putterman (eds.), Economics, Values and Organizations, Cambridge