CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 351-372

  Eisfeldt, Andrea L ^a   Kuhnen, Camelia M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO turnover; Competitive assignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878982012     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.020     Document Type: Article

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