Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycle

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 177-199

  Eisfeldt, Andrea L ^a   Rampini, Adriano A ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Business cycle; Capital reallocation; CEO turnover; Executive compensation

Indexed keywords

EID: 36849034933     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.007     Document Type: Article

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