Exploring the overestimation of conjunctive probabilities

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 4, Issue MAR, 2013, Pages

  Nilsson, Håkan ^a,b   Rieskamp, Jörg ^a   Jenny, Mirjam A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^b UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Accuracy; Configural weighted average hypothesis; Conjunction fallacy; Conjunctive probability; Judgment; Overestimation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878797905     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00101     Document Type: Article

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