Reasoned administration: The European union, the United States, and the project of democratic governance

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 99-124

  Mashaw, Jerry L ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 36849076171     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (113)

1. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 41, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 18, available at http://www.europarl.europa. eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf;
2. see Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. II-101, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, 50, available at http://eur-lex. europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML.
3. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C).
4. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
7. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674, 2680.
8. See Matthew Tempest, Q&A: The EU Constitution, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (London), June 18, 2007, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,2105890,00.html.
9. Klara Kanska suggests that the rights included in article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and article II-101 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe are a somewhat incomplete compilation of the separate rights developed by the Court of Justice and the courts of the member states. Klara Kanska, Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU: The Impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 10 EUR. L.J. 296,299-305 (2004);
10. see also Lord Millet, The Right to Good Administration in European Union Law, 47 PUB. L. 309, 313 (2002) (dating this process of development to Joined Cases 7/56 & 3/57-7/57, Algera v. Common Assembly, 1957 E.C.R. 39).
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
12. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. II-101(2)(b).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
14. CHARLES TILLY, WHY? ix (2006).
15. See id. at x, 14-15.
16. See id. at 19-20.
17. See id. at 15.
18. See generally TILLY, supra note 12 (explaining how reasons work in four categories: conventions, stories, codes, and technical accounts).
19. Indeed, some literature on positive political theory in the United States suggests that this monitoring feature of private rights is the major explanation for procedural safeguards such as the APA. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 244-46 (1987);
20. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442 (1989).
21. John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility (With a Postscript on Accountability), in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 220,221-22 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 221.
24. Id. at 221-22.
25. Id. at 221.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 228-29.
28. See id. at 229-30.
29. See TILLY, supra note 12, at 14-15. See generally Gardner, supra note 18.
30. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (holding that a small group of plaintiffs in a taxation proceeding were denied due process of law when a local board adjusted their tax liabilities on individualized grounds but without providing them with a hearing), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (finding that individuals have no constitutional right entitling them to a hearing before a local taxing commission when changes in their tax liabilities result from a general increase in taxable property rates).
31. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000).
33. Henry Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
34. Id. at 1279-95.
35. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36. Id. at 271.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
39. Id. at 334-35.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
42. Id. § 706(2)(A).
43. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
44. Id. at 416.
45. Id. at 408.
46. Id. at 409
47. Id. at 419.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 420.
50. Id. at 420-21.
51. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
52. See id. at 422.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000).
54. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2000)); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000)); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000)).
55. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
56. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
57. See id. at 51.
58. Id. at 50.
59. See id. at 50-51.
60. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 305 (1987).
61. European Ombudsman, The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, at 16 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/code/ pdf/en/code2005_en.pdf.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 16.
64. Id.
65. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 26, 2001, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 135 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
66. Klara Kanska asserts: [A]ccording to the case law of the Courts, the duty to state reasons has two objectives: it is necessary in order to ensure that the individual has an opportunity to consider whether it is feasible to challenge a given measure, and it serves to ensure that the Court can exercise its powers to review the legality of the measure. Kanska, supra note 8, at 320 (footnotes omitted). Bo Vesterdorf echoes this view: "The statement of reasons . . . must provide information to all persons interested in the measure and ultimately the reasoning must be sufficient to allow the Community Courts to ascertain whether or not the Community measure has been adopted ultra vires." Bo Vesterdorf, Transparency - Not Just a Vogue Word, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 902, 904 (1999).
67. Case 222/86, Union Nationale des Entraîneurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels du Football (UNECTEF) v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097.
68. Id. at 4117.
69. Millet, supra note 8, at 311.
70. See Millet, supra note 8, at 314.
71. See id.
72. Dr. Juli Ponce provides the following examples: The 1947 Italian Constitution establishes that Italian agencies must be organized so as to achieve administrative impartiality and buon andamento. The last words have been considered by many Italian scholars to be a duty of good adminis-tration (buona amministrazione). . . . The current Spanish Constitution of 1978 is especially interesting. It provides in Articles 31 and 103 that public administration must act with objectivity and impartiality, in accordance with the principles of effective action, efficiency, economy and coordination; it also establishes a prohibition of arbitrariness. See Juli Ponce, Good Administration and Administrative Procedures, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 556 (2005) (footnotes omitted). Similar provisions can be found in other countries.
73. For example, Bo Vesterdorf states: Inadequate reasoning means insufficient transparency, because the consequence is, firstly, that the parties affected by the measure are unable to determine whether the measure is issued on a sound legal basis or whether it could be challenged before the courts and, secondly, that the courts are unable to examine whether the arguments on a given point are well-founded. Vesterdorf, supra note 63, at 906 (emphasis added); see also Kanska, supra note 8, at 320 (asserting that "motivation of decisions promotes transparency of administrative actions").
74. A detailed comparison of U.S. and E.U. jurisprudence up through 1992 can be found at Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179,
75. reprinted in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 228, 228-57 (2002).
76. The ECJ does not require European institutions to discuss every item of law or fact "which may have been dealt with during the administrative proceedings"; however, "the reasons on which a decision adversely affecting a person is based must allow the Court to exercise its power of review as to the legality of the decision." Joined Cases 43 & 63/82, VBVB & VBBB v. Comm'n, 1984 E.C.R. 19, 58-59, 1 C.M.L.R. 27, 81 (1985); see Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3500, 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 319 (1985), cited in Julian M. Joshua, The Right to Be Heard in EEC Competition Procedures, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 16, 34 (1991);
77. see also Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 345 (2005) ("[K]nowing the grounds for a Commission decision is one thing, obtaining a reply on every objection of fact, policy, and law is another thing. The European Courts require only that the statement of reasons be complete enough to enable the parties to determine that the administration acted according to law or that they must go to court to vindicate their right to a government of laws and not of men."). A similar principle appears in E.U. member countries' practices. For example, Julian Joshua cites several British cases in this regard. See R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Swati, [1986] 1 All E.R. 717 (A.C.); Greater London Council v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, [1985] 52 P. & C.R. 158 (A.C.); Norwest Holst Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade, [1978] 3 All E.R. 280, 296 (A.C.); Elliott v. Southwark London Borough Council, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 499, 508 (A.C.); Metro. Prop. Holdings Ltd. v. Laufer, [1975] 29 P. & C.R. 172 (Q.B.); Howard v. Borneman, [1974] All E.R. 862 (A.C.). In addition, Joshua notes, "Where there is a duty to give reasons, they have to be intelligible and adequate and deal with the substantial points at issue, but they neither have to set out the full reasoning process of the decision maker nor record all the evidence given or submissions made." Joshua, supra, at 88. The ECJ supported this principle in Case T-323/99, Industrie Navali Meccaniche Affini SpA (INMA) & Italia Investimenti SpA (Itainvest) v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. 11-545, finding it unnecessary to address "all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and all the legal rules governing the matter in question." Id. at 11-562 (citing Case C-56/93, Belgium v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1-723).
78. Jürgen Schwarze comments, "The rigorous control of administrative procedure is particularly intended to counter-balance the far-reaching discretionary powers of the executive." Jurgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of European Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 105 (2004).
79. EC Treaty art. 253, supra note 62, at 135; see Kanska, supra note 8, at 319-20; see also Vesterdorf, supra note 63, at 903 (emphasizing former EC Treaty article 190's - now article 253's - requirement to give reasons). Reason giving in the European context has also been influenced substantially by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, and its reasons requirement. See David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in COMMON LAW THEORY 134, 144-45 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., forthcoming Oct. 2007). Dyzenhaus and Taggart also demonstrate that this influence has pushed the United Kingdom in the direction of a general requirement of reason giving which was absent from common-law jurisdictions outside of Australia until late in the Twentieth Century. See id. at 145.
80. See Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Comm'n, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 1964 C.M.L.R. 29, 35-37. Although the Plaumann decision has been much criticized, the ECJ has reaffirmed its view of standing to review general orders of the Community. See Cornelia Koch, Commission of the European Communities v. Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA., Case C-263/02, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 814, 818-19 (2004). In many cases, a claimant will be able to contest the national measures that implement a Community regulation in national courts on the ground that the regulation being implemented is itself illegal. Id. at 816. Such a case can then produce a referral to the ECJ for a determination of the legality of the Community norm. Id. The EO, however, has declined to accept an appeal based on the claim that no national review possibility existed and that the denial of standing would therefore constitute a denial of justice. See Femke de Lange, Case Note, European Court of Justice, Union de Pequeños Agricultures v. Council, 12 RECIEL 115, 118 (2003).
81. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 841-42 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
82. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 728, 782 (2001).
83. For a more detailed inquiry into the comparative "democracy" of the European Union, the United States, and Swiss federations, see generaUy Thomas D. Zweifel, Democratic Deficits in Comparison: Best (and Worst) Practices in European, US and Swiss Merger Regulation, 41 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 541 (2003) (comparing the "accountability and independence of merger regulation in the European 'regulatory state'" with those of the United States and Switzerland).
84. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 23 (2001)
85. (citing MAX WEBER, 3 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 955-1003 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968)).
86. See Gardner, supra note 18.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000).
88. See EC Treaty art. 253, supra note 62, at 135 (requiring reasons for "[r]egulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the Commission").
89. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554.
90. Id. § 555(e).
91. Id. § 551(12).
92. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 588-89.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 589.
96. Id. at 591.
97. Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987).
98. Id.
99. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 775 (1980).
100. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
101. For a recent general treatment of this topic, see Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 403-33 (2007).
102. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
103. In particular, the requirement that individuals have both a concrete and individualized interest in Community decisions will often exclude beneficiaries of regulatory regimes or other protective regimes because they will not be able to distinguish themselves from the general public, or a broad class of beneficiaries, who are also protected. For a recent case excluding beneficiaries on grounds of standing, see Case C-321/95P, Greenpeace & Others v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1651,1998 3 C.M.L.R. 1, discussed in Nicole Gerard, Case Note, Greenpeace & Others v. the Commission, C-321/95P, 7 RECIEL 209, 209 (1998). See also supra note 75 and accompany-ing text (discussing how the ECJ has foUowed the Plaumann formula, refusing to broaden an individual's standing on matters of general application).
104. E.g., Case T-54/99, max.mobil Telekommunikation Serv. GmbH v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. II-313, II-333.
105. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975).
106. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. See EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, supra note 58.
108. Id.
109. See infra note 104.
110. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor John Tyler (May 26, 1810), reprinted in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 604-05 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), id. at 660-62.
111. This possibility is explored in A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 754, 796-97 (2003).
112. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 192-94 (1997).
113. For one overview among many on democratic theory, see generally IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2003) (exploring democratic theory in relation to the nature of power and domination).