Vetogates, Chevron, preemption

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 83, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1441-1494

  Eskridge Jr , William N ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 51149086811     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (193)

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528-33 (1992); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 706-10 (1997); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 716-27 (1992).
3. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2001).
4. See id. at 1430-38; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (upholding the EPA's construction of a statutory term).
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
6. See Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, Administrative Law Lecture at Duke University School of Law (Jan. 24, 1989), in 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 854-56 (2001).
8. See infra Appendix (listing 94 cases where agency views prevailed, out of 131 cases total).
9. See infra Table 3.
10. McNollgast, supra note 2, at 720 (deploying this felicitous term to describe the multiple kill points for national legislation).
11. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that a court exercising its independent judgment when interpreting a federal statute ought to consider "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control").
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
13. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 109-157, R. XII(2), at 600-06 (2006); DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS 100-01 (1997).
14. See H.R. Doc. No. 109-157, R. XI(2)(c), at 546-47.
15. See id.
16. Cf. KING, supra note 13, at 20-21 (explaining that committee members' "entrepreneurial motivations" cause them to "try to grab territory that will benefit them").
17. See U.S. Senate, Résumé of Congressional Activity, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/Resumes.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (providing data on the number of bills introduced, reported from committee, and voted upon from the 80th Congress to the present).
18. See STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6-11 (1988).
19. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 33-35 (4th ed. 2007).
20. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, R. XVII, at 12 (2007).
21. See id. R. XXVI(S), at 30.
22. See id. R. XII(4), at 8.
23. See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? 6-29 (1997).
24. See S. Doc. No. 110-9, R. XXII(2), at 15-17.
25. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 35-37.
26. See Seth Grossman, Tricameral Legislating: Statutory Interpretation in an Era of Conference Committee Ascendancy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 251, 266-70 (2005).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, els. 2-3.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
31. See id.
32. See JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT 132-64 (1995).
33. See Grossman, supra note 26, at 272-81.
34. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (3d ed. 2007); see also GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE 61-87, 102-34 (2001) (offering a pioneering account of how some legislative vetogates can be avoided through "omnibus legislation").
35. Moreover, it would be easy to expand the model to include vetogates omitted in Figure 1. Most major legislation is referred to subcommittees in both the House and the Senate, which theoretically represent additional kill points. The Senate filibuster might be broken up into "motion to consider" filibusters and "debate on the merits" filibusters, both of which were activated during the Senate's lengthy debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 15-22. Moreover, Senate Rule XXII (2) allows but regulates post-cloture amendments that can seriously stall legislation. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, R. XXII(2), at 15-17 (2007).
36. So here I disagree with Clark, supra note 3, at 1341.
37. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, 26, 31, 40, 42, 46, 49 U.S.C.).
38. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 11 n.14 (2005).
39. See DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL 56-71 (2002).
40. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165, 168 (1992).
41. See Clark, supra note 3, at 1328.
42. To distinguish a logroll from a compromise, I am using the former term to entail the sponsors' support for an unrelated proposal (logroll), rather than their willingness to trim back their own proposal (a compromise).
43. See, e.g., SINCLAIR, supra note 34, at 91-93, 127-28 (describing the increased use of variegated omnibus legislation to gain support from legislative and executive actors with differing agendas); id. at 143-59 (2d ed. 2000) (illustrating the operation of the unorthodox lawmaking model by reference to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988); see also KRUTZ, supra note 34, at 102-23 (examining in detail bills bundled into omnibus legislation).
44. See, e.g., Glen S. Krutz, Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus BiUs in Congress, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 210, 213-15 (2001) (describing die rise in omnibus legislation in the years following World War II).
45. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 1-4, 84 Stat. 1236, 1238-41 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
46. See id. §§ 401-410, 84 Stat. at 1260-69 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-850 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)) (creating criminal liability for the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession of controlled substances).
47. The 1970 Act also included a number of compromises, of course. See, e.g., MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 39, at 67-71 (following the last-stage bargaining which yielded numerous compromises).
48. On the "status quo basis" of endowment effects, see Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-44 (1980), which originated the term "endowment effect," and Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1503-04 (1998).
49. Even statutes such as the Voting Rights Act and the USA PATRIOT Act, which sunset after a period of years, seem to enjoy a regulatory endowment effect when they come up for legislative renewal. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
50. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1507 (2006); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 302 n.235 (2000).
51. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209-10 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
52. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 54 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 45 (1982). The shift from courts to agencies was primarily driven by the expertise agencies brought to particular statutory schemes, but also by the distrust some legislative and executive department officials harbored toward judges and by the (related) belief that agencies would be more responsive to evolving congressional or presidential preferences than judges. See id. at 44-45.
54. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disor ders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002) (describing and providing examples of Congress' use of ambiguous language); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevrons Mistake 14-17 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing "deliberate ambiguities" as congressional delegations to agencies).
55. The dominant reason for greater regulation would be agency turf-building. Concededly, this might be offset by countervailing congressional pressure through the appropriations process. Another possible reason would be presidential pressure, which of course can cut against regulation as well as for it.
56. See Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970); Harrison Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970).
57. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (2000).
58. See id. § 811 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
59. For examples of agency updating, anabolic steroids have been listed as a Schedule III substance and GHB (liquid ecstasy) has been listed as a Schedule I substance. For current Schedules, see 21 C.F.R. § 1308 (2007). Marijuana has been a source of frequent and extended administrative deliberation but remains a Schedule I substance, even when required for legitimate medical reasons. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 n.23 (2005) (discussing the unsuccessful campaign to reclassify marijuana).
60. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 822-823 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
62. Id. § 823(f) (2000) (listing denial of registration as one of the Attorney General's powers); id. § 824(a)(4) (listing suspension of a title to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance as one of the Attorney General's powers).
63. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 31-34 (interpreting the CSA to preempt California's medical marijuana law); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 142-43 (1975) (interpreting the CSA to criminalize medical misuse of controlled substances).
64. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001) (stating the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule). Compare Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243, 269-75 (2006) (rejecting the Attorney General's assertion of his CSA authority to preempt Oregon's aid-in-dying law), with id. at 299-302 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing ironically that the Court has sanctioned broad DOJ control over medical practice, traditionally reserved to the states).
65. See supra Part I.
66. The best discussion of these points is Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 791-94 (2004).
67. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
68. Following Judge Bork, the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Sherman Act assumes that its goal is enhancement of overall social utility and economic efficiency, a goal that is inconsistent with Congress' original goals, as revealed in the extensive legislative history of the statute. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 101, 103 (3d ed. 2006).
69. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721-26 (2007) (expressing an almost cavalier disregard for one of the Court's oldest Sher-man Act precedents); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1997).
70. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2721-26 (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
71. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Federation of America in Support of Respondent at 22-25, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-180), 2007 WL 621853 (showing how Congress reaffirmed Dr. Miles in a 1975 statute and subsequent appropriations laws).
72. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2007).
73. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1122-23 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243 (2006); see also Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, S. 2151, 105th Cong. (1998) (similar bills proposed by Rep. Hyde and Sen. Nickles).
74. See supra Figures 2a-c, 3a.
75. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 387-89 (1991).
76. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 2, at 528-33.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
78. See id. art. I, §§ 5, 7. Professor Strauss cogently argues that agency rules and judicial common law might have preemptive effect under the Supremacy Clause. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1590-92 (2008). The Supreme Court's rulings to that effect might be reconciled with the constitutional text on the ground that preemptive agency rules and judicial decisions are issued pursuant to federal statutory authorization (implicit in the case of judicial common law).
79. Compare Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908, 950-51(1994) (criticizing public law's celebration of federalism as a "national neurosis"), with Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (celebrating the various virtues of federalism).
80. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative power ... is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.").
81. Cf. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935) (admitting that Congress may delegate legislative authority if it has established an "'intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform,'" but finding that the delegation at hand was impermissible because "Congress ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no standard, ha[d] laid down no rule" (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
82. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2130-38 (2004); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1983).
83. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
84. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554, 701-706 (2000).
85. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-84 (1992) (arguing that Chevron was not revolutionary at the Supreme Court level).
88. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 372-82, 397-98 (1986) (arguing that Chevron is at odds with the Court's Marbury role).
89. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 499-526 (1989) (criticizing a strong version of Chevron as contrary to original constitutional concerns about excessive delegation and alienation of policymaking from "We the People's" elected representatives).
90. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
91. See id. at 1120-36.
92. See id. at 1109-11.
93. See id. at 1145-48.
94. Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
95. Compare id. at 256-75 (applying Skidmore after finding that the Attorney General's interpretive rule was not promulgated pursuant to a congressional delegation of lawmaking), with id. at 276-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analyzing various regulations and arguing for Chevron deference).
96. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
97. See id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 744-45 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 773-89 (Souter.J., concurring); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 789-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
98. See Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, 546 U.S. at 256-75.
99. See id. at 285-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731).
100. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
101. See id. at 866.
102. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 91, at 1111-15 (discussing "consultative deference" cases decided by the Supreme Court); see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2111-12 (2000) (urging the Court to abandon the inconsistently invoked presumption against preemption in legal arenas traditionally regulated by the states).
103. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
104. See Merrill, supra note 83, at 2130-38.
105. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Chevron in this regard was following earlier Supreme Court formulations supporting special deference. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977).
106. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
107. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 89, at 372-82, 397-98; Farina, supra note 90, at 499-526; see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 193-99 (1998) (providing the most comprehensive demonstration that a broad understanding of Chevron is inconsistent with the original expectations as well as the plain meaning and structure of the APA).
108. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 506-11 (2003); Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 128-29 (2000); Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1231-42 (2006).
109. 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (allowing the Attorney General, in consultation with HHS, to add new drugs to one of the controlled drug schedules and to shift drugs around within the schedules). 111 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
110. See id. at 226-27.
111. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 91, at 1125 tbl.4 (showing that seventy-six of eighty-five Chevron-applying cases from 1984-2006 were ones where the agency was acting pursuant to an explicit delegation of lawmaking authority); cf. id. (indicating that, ironically, there were 267 cases where Chevron might have been applied for this reason, but only seventy-six of those 267 cases explicitly followed Chevron).
112. See id.
113. See Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243, 258-69 (2006).
114. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
115. See infra Appendix (listing 131 cases in my study, including at least 24 cases where an agency was asserting that state law was preempted by an agency order, rule, standard, or inaction).
116. A jurisdiction (in the South) covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2007), cannot make voting and districting changes without "preclearance," either through DOJ or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, id. Hence, section 5 cases involve preemption in that sense: if DOJ does not preclear, the state statutory change is blocked; if DOJ does preclear, the state statutory change goes into effect unless the courts override the Department. See id.
117. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 676 (1993) (holding that Department of Transportation regulations preempted state speed limit rules but did not preempt state negligence causes of action); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 425 (1986) (holding that a Federal Emergency Regulatory Commission order preempted state law).
118. In Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985), the Court correctly applied Chevron, but in Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1992), the Court invoked Chevron in a Voting Rights section 5 case, even though the Court generally does not apply Chevron in those circumstances. In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-86 (2000), the Court applied Seminole Rock deference (generally similar to and perhaps more deferential than Chevron) to the agency's interpretation of its own standard.
119. See infra Appendix.
120. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 823-824 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
121. 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also id. § 871 (b) (2000) (delegating authority to make rules deemed "necessary and appropriate" for the Attorney General's administration of the CSA).
122. Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243, 281-85 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 275-99 (criticizing the majority's reasoning).
124. See id. at 292-98.
125. See id. at 258-61, 267-68 (majority opinion).
126. See id. at 281-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 275 (majority opinion).
128. See id. at 261-63.
129. See id. at 265 (invoking 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2000)).
130. On the political give and take between politicians supporting a punitive approach and broad DOJ supervision of drug programs, versus those supporting a treatment/medical approach and greater involvement by HEW (the predecessor agency to HHS), see MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 39, at 58-62, 67-71.
131. See Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, 546 U.S. at 259 ("Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General authority to carry out or effect all provisions of the CSA. Rather, he can promulgate rules relating only to 'registration' and 'control' ...").
132. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
133. City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988) (emphasis added). The logic might be that it is the Article I, Section 7 "Law" that preempts state law, and the agency directive or regulation is preemptive as an "interpretation" of that "Law." Thomas W. Merrill argues that Congress has authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize the delegation of lawmaking authority to agencies. See Merrill, supra note 83, at 2120-39.
134. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 19, at 1138.
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2000).
136. See id. § 829.
137. Compare Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (applying the antipreemption presumption), with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006-11 (2008) (ignoring the antipreemption presumption, in a case raising very similar issues). See generally Dinh, supra note 103 (noting the Court's capricious invocation of the antipreemption presumption and urging the Court to abandon it).
138. Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006). Somewhat confusingly, this passage came at the end of the Court's discussion of the proper interpretation of the CSA, but the target of the passage was the Attorney General's argument that the CSA's prescription requirement, 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2000), authorized the Ashcroft Directive's preemption of state law.
139. Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, 546 U.S. at 269-70.
140. Id. at 270 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475).
141. See id. at 275.
142. See infra Appendix.
143. On the different grounds for preemption, see S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 851 n.103 (1992).
144. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (providing a somewhat different list of Skidmore factors: "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency's position" (footnotes omitted)).
145. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 39), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/ constitutionallaw/Merrill.pdf.
146. See id. (manuscript at 37); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 502-20 (2008) (suggesting an "agency reference" approach that abjures a formal deference regime in favor of a fact-based functional approach open to expertise-reflecting agency inputs).
147. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 91, at 1099 tbl.1 (reporting Chevron deference in 8.3% of the Court's agency interpretation cases from 1984-2006; Skidmore deference in 6.7% of the cases; and "consultative deference" in a whopping 17.8% of the cases).
148. See id. at 1111-15, 1144.
149. 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
150. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(12) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
151. See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 512-14.
152. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondents at 29-30, Wimberly, 479 U.S. 511 (No. 85-129), 1986 WL 728133.
153. See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 514-23.
154. See id. at 515 (relying on the government's brief for a factual description of state unemployment compensation practices); id. at 519-20 (relying on the government's history of the statute to show that the Congress enacting the statute had before it a Department of Labor letter indicating that nineteen states treated pregnancy-based dismissals as not compensable under their unemployment schemes); id. at 521-22 (relying on the government's brief to show that contemporaneous understandings of the statute allowed noncoverage of pregnancy-based terminations so long as they were not singled out from other terminations "for cause").
155. See Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243, 269-75 (2006).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348-49 (1971); cf. Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case, 546 U.S. at 262-63 (invoking rule of lenity concerns as an additional reason not to credit the Attorney General's directive).
157. For an excellent argument that most preemption cases involve "displacement" of state law and thereby deeply implicate the state-federal balance, see the sources cited infra note 162.
158. E.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-09 (2008) (agreeing with an agency's interpretation of a medical device law's preemption clause but pointedly declining to rely on the agency position); Cal. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 278-79, 282-92 (1987) (rejecting an agency's interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's explicit preemption provision).
159. E.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2677-88 (2006) (following an agency's brief and specific argumentation in holding a state criminal process not conflict-preempted by international convention); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-27 (2003) (following an agency's lead and specific argumentation in holding a state holocaust disclosure law field-preempted).
160. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 783-85 (1994) (distinguishing between federal law's "trumping" state law and "displac[ing]" it); Merrill, supra note 147 (manuscript at 4-12, 31-34) (applying Gardbaum's distinction to argue for a focus on policy balancing in judicial preemption analysis).
161. E.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 209-11 (2004); Mendelson, supra note 67, at 794-97.
162. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 676-82 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
163. See Gonzales v. Oregon (Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case), 546 U.S. 243, 299 (2006).
164. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 224-25 (1995).
165. Pub. L. No. 94-504, § 105(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1705, 1708.
166. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 225-32.
167. See id. at 228-33.
168. See id. (specifically citing and following the suggested resolution in the United States' amicus brief).
169. See id. at 238-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
170. See Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1987).
171. I do have a normative qualm about Wimberly, explained below.
172. E.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1569-73 (2007) (following a long-held Comptroller of the Currency view regarding the preemptive authority of the National Bank Act, although not invoking any deference regime); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2677-88 (2006) (following a long-held executive department views about the preemption of state law by consular treaties, although not invoking any deference regime); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist, 541 U.S. 246, 252-58 (2004) (following a long-held Environmental Protection Agency interpretation of the Clean Air Act preemption provision, although not invoking any deference regime).
173. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379-379a (2000)).
174. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
175. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
176. See id. 1002-07.
177. See id. 1007-09.
178. See id. at 1016 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 1006-11 (majority opinion); id. at 1011-12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
180. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (k) (2000)).
181. See id.
182. See infra Appendix; cf. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 57 tbl.5 (2006) (finding that 52% of the Rehnquist Court's preemption cases resulted in displacement of state law by federal law).
183. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1374-98 (2006) (showing that business groups are achieving deregulation at the state level through preemption litigation).
184. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
185. See id. at 1569-73.
186. See id. at 1573-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. See Jonathan Macey, Connecting Procedure to Substance: Treatment by Appellate Courts of Decisions by Three Legally Authorized Institutions-Corporate Boards of Directors, Administrative Agencies and Congress 21-30, 33-35 (Feb. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
188. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 758-841 (4th ed. 2006).
189. For earlier academic calls to focus on subject-area-specific rather than just general theories of statutory interpretation, see Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023 (1998).
190. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 166, 166-88 (Richard A Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
191. See LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 190, at 758-841; Macey, supra note 189.
192. See Sharkey, supra note 148, at 480-502 (examining specific substantive and institutional factors that ought to be relevant to the preemption of products liability law).
193. See Merrill, supra note 192, at 180-87 (suggesting partiality, cost-exporting, and antibalkanization principles to guide courts and perhaps agencies in environmental preemption cases).