On doing better, experimental-style

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 145, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 455-464

  Weinberg, Jonathan M ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental philosophy; Intuitions; Judgment; Philosophical methodology; Skepticism

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350043114     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9405-7     Document Type: Article

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