Mathematical thought and its objects

Mathematical thought and its Objects

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-378

  Parsons, Charles ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84926158939     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511498534     Document Type: Book

References (399)

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399. Cantor