Coordination on egalitarian networks from asymmetric relations in a social game of chicken

Advances in Complex Systems

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2013, Pages

  Tsvetkova, Milena ^a   Buskens, Vincent ^b  

^a 372 Uris Hall ^*  (United States)

^b UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

experimental sociology; Game theory; reciprocity; social networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875824403     PISSN: 02195259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219525913500057     Document Type: Article

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