Cooperation in intergroup, N-person, and two-person games of chicken

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 384-406

  Bornstein, Gary ^b   Budescu, David ^a   Zamir, Shmuel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031161197     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041003003     Document Type: Article

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