Cooperation in evolving social networks

Management Science

Volumn 53, Issue 7, 2007, Pages 1036-1050

  Hanaki, Nobuyuki ^a   Peterhansl, Alexander ^b   Dodds, Peter S ^c   Watts, Duncan J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^c University of Vermont   (United States)

Author keywords

Games group decisions; Networks graphs; Simulation; Theory

Indexed keywords

GAMES-GROUP DECISIONS; GLOBAL EXPANSION; LOCAL STRUCTURES; NETWORKS-GRAPHS;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COMPETITION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; LEARNING SYSTEMS; PROBABILITY;

SOCIAL ASPECTS;

EID: 36649027983     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0625     Document Type: Article

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