Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 66-73

  Voigt, Stefan ^a   Gutmann, Jerg ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Constitutional Economics; Credible commitment; Independent judiciary; Property rights; Transmission channels

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875278280     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2013.01.007     Document Type: Article

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