Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 326-348

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b,c,d,e   Voigt, Stefan ^c,f  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

^d IZA ^*  (Germany)

^e KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^f UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Credibility; Delegation of competence; Dilemma of the strong state; International organizations

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052455217     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.003     Document Type: Article

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