Political institutions and property rights: Veto players and foreign exchange commitments in 127 countries

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 211-240

  Weymouth, Stephen ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

financial development; foreign exchange; institutions; political economy; property rights; veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551618766     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414010382629     Document Type: Article

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