Inflation, central bank independence, and the legal system

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 164, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 731-777

  Hayo, Bernd ^a   Voigt, Stefan ^a  

^a PHILIPPS UNIVERSITY MARBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 56849099011     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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