Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?

Energy Economics

Volumn 37, Issue , 2013, Pages 82-99

  Libman, Alexander ^a,b  

^a FRANKFURT SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT   (Germany)

^b RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Conditional growth effect of resources; Democracy; Oil and gas; Russian regions; Sub national political regimes

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; GROWTH EFFECTS; OIL AND GAS; RUSSIAN REGIONS; SUB-NATIONAL POLITICAL REGIMES;

NATURAL RESOURCES;

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS;

DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIZATION; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ENERGY EFFICIENCY; GAS SUPPLY; NATURAL RESOURCE; OIL SUPPLY;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 84874550242     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2013.02.003     Document Type: Article

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