Policy uncertainty in hybrid regimes: Evidence from firm-level surveys

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 486-510

  Kenyon, Thomas ^a   Naoi, Megumi ^b  

^a UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Economic development; Policy uncertainty; Political risk; Transition economies

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649213866     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414009355267     Document Type: Article

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