Interest group politics in a federation

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 94, Issue 9-10, 2010, Pages 730-748

  Guriev, Sergei ^a,b   Yakovlev, Evgeny ^c   Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina ^a,d,e  

^a NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^e EHESS   (France)

Author keywords

Federalism; Inter jurisdictional externalities; Inter state trade barriers; Interest groups; Multinational firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955272735     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.004     Document Type: Article

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