Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 123-139

  Gehlbach, Scott ^a   Keefer, Philip ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Credible commitment; Dictatorship; Investment; Ruling parties

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957668367     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002     Document Type: Article

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