Businessman candidates

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 718-736

  Gehlbach, Scott ^a   Sonin, Konstantin ^b   Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

^c PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954841032     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00456.x     Document Type: Article

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