The new federalism and the paradoxes of regional sovereignty in Russia

Comparative Politics

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2005, Pages

  Bahry, Donna ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 13644265151     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20072879     Document Type: Review

References (120)

1. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics, 2 (1970), 337-64.
2. Philip Roeder, "Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions," Slavic Review, 58 (Winter 1999), 854-82.
3. Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," World Development, 21 (1993), 1355-69.
4. For overviews, see Robert Orttung, "Putin's Main Accomplishment Is Centralization," EWI Russian Regional Report, 6 (East-West Institute, December 19, 2001); Daniel Kempton, "Russian Federalism: Continuing Myth or Political Salvation?," Demokratizatsiya, 9 (2001), 201 12.
5. For overviews, see Robert Orttung, "Putin's Main Accomplishment Is Centralization," EWI Russian Regional Report, 6 (East-West Institute, December 19, 2001); Daniel Kempton, "Russian Federalism: Continuing Myth or Political Salvation?," Demokratizatsiya, 9 (2001), 201-42.
6. See www.cityline.ru:8084/politika/reg/dogovory.html.
7. Thomas Remington, "Putin and the Duma," Post-Soviet Affairs, 17 (2001), 285-308; Regina Smyth, "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia," Politics and Society, 30 (2002), 555-78.
8. Thomas Remington, "Putin and the Duma," Post-Soviet Affairs, 17 (2001), 285-308; Regina Smyth, "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia," Politics and Society, 30 (2002), 555-78.
9. One set of constraints has already been emphasized in detail elsewhere. Most republics lack external borders and/or a numerical majority for the titular nationality, making it difficult to mount a credible threat of separation. Gail Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-communist Russia," in Gail Lapidus, ed., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 79-114.
10. I conducted interviews with government officials, academics, and journalists in both regions from 1997 through 2002. In keeping with provisions governing human subjects research, I have omitted the names of the individuals I interviewed.
11. Karen L. Remmer and Erik Wibbels, "The Subnational Politics of Economic Adjustment: Provincial Politics and Fiscal Performance in Argentina." Comparative Political Studies, 33 (May 2000), 419-51.
12. Daniel Treisman, "Political Decentralization and Economic Reform: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," American Journal of Political Science, 43 (1999), 488-517.
13. Richard Snyder, "After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico," World Politics, 51 (1999), 173-204.
14. Remmer and Wibbels, pp. 429-34; Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, "Why Is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism So Inefficient?" (1999), www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive_99/19990003.pdf; William Dillinger and Steven B. Webb, "Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies: Argentina and Brazil," www.worldbank.org/html/doc/publications/workpapers/wps2000series/wps2121wps2121. pdf.
15. Remmer and Wibbels, pp. 429-34; Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, "Why Is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism So Inefficient?" (1999), www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive_99/19990003.pdf; William Dillinger and Steven B. Webb, "Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies: Argentina and Brazil," www.worldbank.org/html/doc/publications/workpapers/wps2000series/wps2121wps2121. pdf.
16. Remmer and Wibbels, pp. 429-34; Sebastian M. Saiegh and Mariano Tommasi, "Why Is Argentina's Fiscal Federalism So Inefficient?" (1999), www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive_99/19990003.pdf; William Dillinger and Steven B. Webb, "Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies: Argentina and Brazil," www.worldbank.org/html/doc/publications/workpapers/wps2000series/wps2121wps2121. pdf.
17. I b i d.
18. Allyson Lucinda Benton, "Federalism and the Stability of Provincial Party Systems in Argentina: Regional Development Policies, Fiscal Resources, and Provincial Politics during Economic Reform," American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, August 2000, Washington, D.C., pp. 21-22.
19. Dillinger and Webb.
20. Scott Mainwaring and David Samuels, "Federalism, Constraints on the Central Government and Economic Reform in Democratic Brazil," Kellogg Center Working Paper No. 271, November 1999.
21. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 113; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "W(h)ither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia's Stalled Reforms," www.princeton.edu/~kesw/whither%20tb.e%20state%208sub2.pdf; Raj M. Desai and Itzhak Goldberg, "The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring," The World Bank Research Observer, 16 (2001), 219-40. Not all assessments are negative, however. Some authors argue that asymmetrical federalism helped ease the problems of transition from the old, hypercentralized system. See Mikhail Filippov and Ol'ga Shvetsova, "Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian Federation: A Path-Dependence Explanation," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (March 1999), 61-76; and Mikhail Alexseev, "Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance," Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), 101-6.
22. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 113; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "W(h)ither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia's Stalled Reforms," www.princeton.edu/~kesw/whither%20tb.e%20state%208sub2.pdf; Raj M. Desai and Itzhak Goldberg, "The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring," The World Bank Research Observer, 16 (2001), 219-40. Not all assessments are negative, however. Some authors argue that asymmetrical federalism helped ease the problems of transition from the old, hypercentralized system. See Mikhail Filippov and Ol'ga Shvetsova, "Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian Federation: A Path-Dependence Explanation," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (March 1999), 61-76; and Mikhail Alexseev, "Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance," Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), 101-6.
23. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 113; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "W(h)ither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia's Stalled Reforms," www.princeton.edu/~kesw/whither%20tb.e%20state%208sub2.pdf; Raj M. Desai and Itzhak Goldberg, "The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring," The World Bank Research Observer, 16 (2001), 219-40. Not all assessments are negative, however. Some authors argue that asymmetrical federalism helped ease the problems of transition from the old, hypercentralized system. See Mikhail Filippov and Ol'ga Shvetsova, "Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian Federation: A Path-Dependence Explanation," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (March 1999), 61-76; and Mikhail Alexseev, "Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance," Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), 101-6.
24. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 113; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "W(h)ither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia's Stalled Reforms," www.princeton.edu/~kesw/whither%20tb.e%20state%208sub2.pdf; Raj M. Desai and Itzhak Goldberg, "The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring," The World Bank Research Observer, 16 (2001), 219-40. Not all assessments are negative, however. Some authors argue that asymmetrical federalism helped ease the problems of transition from the old, hypercentralized system. See Mikhail Filippov and Ol'ga Shvetsova, "Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian Federation: A Path-Dependence Explanation," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (March 1999), 61-76; and Mikhail Alexseev, "Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance," Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), 101-6.
25. Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 113; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "W(h)ither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia's Stalled Reforms," www.princeton.edu/~kesw/whither%20tb.e%20state%208sub2.pdf; Raj M. Desai and Itzhak Goldberg, "The Politics of Russian Enterprise Reform: Insiders, Local Governments, and the Obstacles to Restructuring," The World Bank Research Observer, 16 (2001), 219-40. Not all assessments are negative, however. Some authors argue that asymmetrical federalism helped ease the problems of transition from the old, hypercentralized system. See Mikhail Filippov and Ol'ga Shvetsova, "Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian Federation: A Path-Dependence Explanation," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (March 1999), 61-76; and Mikhail Alexseev, "Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance," Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), 101-6.
26. Darrell Slider, "Russia's Market-Distorting Federalism," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 38 (October 1997), 445-60.
27. Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Samuels and Fernando Abrucio, "Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The 'New' Politics of the Governors in Brazil," Publius, 30 (2000), 43-61.
28. Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Samuels and Fernando Abrucio, "Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The 'New' Politics of the Governors in Brazil," Publius, 30 (2000), 43-61.
29. Hagopian, p. 16, defines "traditional" regions as those with a narrow concentration of political power, restricted access to decision making, hierarchical channels of political representation, and limited political competition.
30. See, for example, David Samuels and Richard Snyder, "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 651-71; Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?" Daedalus, 129 (Spring 2000), 145-69.
31. See, for example, David Samuels and Richard Snyder, "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 651-71; Alfred Stepan, "Brazil's Decentralized Federalism: Bringing Government Closer to the Citizens?" Daedalus, 129 (Spring 2000), 145-69.
32. Alfred P. Montero, "After Decentralization: Patterns of Intergovernmental Conflict in Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and Mexico," Publius, 31 (Fall 2001), 43-66.
33. See, for example, Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 220-24; Donna Bahry, "The Union Republics and Contradictions in Gorbachev's Economic Reform," Soviet Economy, 7 (1991), 215-55.
34. See, for example, Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 220-24; Donna Bahry, "The Union Republics and Contradictions in Gorbachev's Economic Reform," Soviet Economy, 7 (1991), 215-55.
35. Tatarstan's Mintimir Shaimiev and the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg were the first regional/local leaders to stand for direct election, on the same day as Boris Yeltsin, June 12, 1991. Ten other republics held presidential elections in the next year. The majority of Russian regions had gubernatorial elections only in 1995-97. Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, eds., Politicheskii almanakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow: Moskosvkii Tsentr Karnegi, 1995), pp. 11-23; Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
36. Tatarstan's Mintimir Shaimiev and the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg were the first regional/local leaders to stand for direct election, on the same day as Boris Yeltsin, June 12, 1991. Ten other republics held presidential elections in the next year. The majority of Russian regions had gubernatorial elections only in 1995-97. Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, eds., Politicheskii almanakh Rossii 1995 (Moscow: Moskosvkii Tsentr Karnegi, 1995), pp. 11-23; Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
37. Daniel Treisman, "Russia's 'Ethnic Revival': The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order," World Politics, 49 (1997), 212-49; Kathleen Dowley, "Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional Government Strategies," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31 (1998), 359-80.
38. Daniel Treisman, "Russia's 'Ethnic Revival': The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order," World Politics, 49 (1997), 212-49; Kathleen Dowley, "Striking the Federal Bargain in Russia: Comparative Regional Government Strategies," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31 (1998), 359-80.
39. Yakutia alone accounted for 18 percent of Russian's land mass and virtually all of its diamonds.
40. In practice, however, the war of laws between USSR and union republic authorities left lower-level authorities a good deal of discretion about which rules to follow.
41. Roman Solchanyk, "The Draft Union Treaty and the 'Big Five,'" RFE/RL Report on the USSR (May 3, 1991), 16-18. According to a Tatarstani official who participated in the negotiations, Gorbachev promised that representatives of the republic would attend the signing scheduled for August 1991 but sign the treaty itself at a later date. Interview, Kazan', February 2002.
42. Robert Sharlet, "The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics," Publius, 24 (1994), 115-27; Aleksandr Arinin, "Problemy razvitiia Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti v kontse XX veka," in M. N. Guboglo et al., eds., Federalizm vlasti i vlast'federalizma (Moscow: TOO Inteltekh, 1997), pp. 7-107.
43. Robert Sharlet, "The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics," Publius, 24 (1994), 115-27; Aleksandr Arinin, "Problemy razvitiia Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti v kontse XX veka," in M. N. Guboglo et al., eds., Federalizm vlasti i vlast'federalizma (Moscow: TOO Inteltekh, 1997), pp. 7-107.
44. See Regina Smyth, "Ideological vs. Regional Cleavages: Do the Radicals Control the RSFSR Parliament?" Journal of Soviet Nationalities, 1 (Fall 1990), 112-57.
45. Arinin, pp. 52-56.
46. Efforts to draft a new basic law began in 1990 but were slowed by executive-legislative battles and by opposition from various quarters. See Vera Tolz, "Drafting the New Russian Constitution," RFE/RL Research Report, 2 (July 16, 1993), 1-12.
47. Lapidus and Walker, pp. 99-101.
48. A list of the treaties and the dates they were signed is available at www.cityline.ru:8084/politika/reg/dogovory.html.
49. The first seven republics seemed to fall into one of two groups, either rich in resources and pressing for more rights to them (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, and Sakha) or located in the North Caucasus and influenced by events in Chechnya (North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria).
50. Jeffrey Kahn, Federalism, Demoralization and the Rule of Law in Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 162.
51. Kempton, "Russian Federalism."
52. The only exceptions were Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Udmurtia. The other two republics (Sakha and Komi) and all of the Russian regions explicitly recognized the preeminence of federal law. See Guboglo.
53. I b i d.
54. See Peter Kirkow, "Foreign Trade Arrangements in Russia and Its Regions: Relying on Foreign Capital to Generate Growth?," Post-Communist Economies, 11 (1999), 79-98; U.S. Trade Representative, "1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," www.ustr.gov/pdf/1997_russia.pdf, and "2000 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," www.ustr.gov/html/2000.
55. See Peter Kirkow, "Foreign Trade Arrangements in Russia and Its Regions: Relying on Foreign Capital to Generate Growth?," Post-Communist Economies, 11 (1999), 79-98; U.S. Trade Representative, "1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," www.ustr.gov/pdf/1997_russia.pdf, and "2000 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," www.ustr.gov/html/2000.
56. See Peter Kirkow, "Foreign Trade Arrangements in Russia and Its Regions: Relying on Foreign Capital to Generate Growth?," Post-Communist Economies, 11 (1999), 79-98; U.S. Trade Representative, "1997 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," www.ustr.gov/pdf/1997_russia.pdf, and "2000 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," www.ustr.gov/html/2000.
57. Peter Westin, "Foreign Direct Investments in Russia," Russian Economic Trends, 1 (1999), 36-43. The EBRD estimated Russia's foreign direct investment at less than $50 per capita per year during 1996-1999, lower than almost all other East European and former Soviet states except Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 2000: Employment, Skills and Transition (London: EBRD, 2000), p. 88.
58. Peter Westin, "Foreign Direct Investments in Russia," Russian Economic Trends, 1 (1999), 36-43. The EBRD estimated Russia's foreign direct investment at less than $50 per capita per year during 1996-1999, lower than almost all other East European and former Soviet states except Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 2000: Employment, Skills and Transition (London: EBRD, 2000), p. 88.
59. Gary N. Wilson, "'Crude' Federalism, Oil Politics and the Evolution of Intergovernmental Relations in Post-Soviet Russia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2000).
60. See S. Peregudov, Krupnaia Rossiiskaia korporatsiia kak sotsial'no-politicheskii institut (Moscow: Institut mirovoi ekonomiki i mezhdunardodnykh otnoshenii, 2000); Izvestia, Apr. 21, 1999, p. 1.
61. See S. Peregudov, Krupnaia Rossiiskaia korporatsiia kak sotsial'no-politicheskii institut (Moscow: Institut mirovoi ekonomiki i mezhdunardodnykh otnoshenii, 2000); Izvestia, Apr. 21, 1999, p. 1.
62. Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1999); A. Lavrov, J. Litwack, and D. Sutherland, "Reforma mezhbiudzhetnykh otnoshenii v Rossii: 'Federalizm, sozdaiushchii rynok'," Voprosy Ekonomiki, 4 (2001), 32-51; Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 62-65.
63. Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1999); A. Lavrov, J. Litwack, and D. Sutherland, "Reforma mezhbiudzhetnykh otnoshenii v Rossii: 'Federalizm, sozdaiushchii rynok'," Voprosy Ekonomiki, 4 (2001), 32-51; Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 62-65.
64. Lev Freinkman, Daniel Treisman, and Stepan Titov, Subnational Budgeting in Russia (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1999); A. Lavrov, J. Litwack, and D. Sutherland, "Reforma mezhbiudzhetnykh otnoshenii v Rossii: 'Federalizm, sozdaiushchii rynok'," Voprosy Ekonomiki, 4 (2001), 32-51; Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 62-65.
65. Control over republic and regional expenditures was less detailed, a substantial change from the Soviet era. Subnational governments did, though, face a different kind of constraint on the spending side, through the large number of unfunded federal mandates.
66. Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland, pp. 32-51.
67. Daniel Treisman, "Russia's Taxing Problem," Foreign Policy, 112 (Fall 1998), 55-60. Shleifer and Treisman, ch. 6, report that Yeltsin had issued a decree granting regions the right to levy additional taxes during 1994-96, but it is not clear how much extra revenue it yielded, given the high tax burdens already in place under federal law.
68. Philip Hanson, Sergei Artobolevskiy, Olga Kouznetsova, and Douglas Sutherland, "Federal Government Responses to Regional Economic Change," in Philip Hanson and Michael Bradshaw, eds., Regional Economic Change in Russia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), pp. 97-132.
69. Most of the budget revenue from the diamond monopoly after 1992 came from rental payments on the assets of the old Soviet firm Yakutalmaz, paid to the government of Sakha. Revenues from the diamond "markup" - the share of diamonds allotted to the republic government at cost during 1992-97 and sold overseas at world market prices - went into republic government extrabudgetary funds.
70. Obstacles to foreign investment were not solely created in Moscow. Incumbent regional leaders could be extremely negative toward outside capital, as noted in Philip Hanson, "Understanding Regional Patterns of Economic Change in Post-communist Russia" (unpublished ms., n.d.). However, the problems in the Russian economic system as a whole gave a political edge to the protectionists and undermined advocates of a more open regional economy.
71. Edward Walker, "The Dog That Didn't Bark: Tatarstan and Asymmetrical Federalism in Russia," The Harriman Review, 9 (Winter 1996), 1-35.
72. Elise Giuliano, "Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-Determination? Identity and Preference Formation in Tatarstan's Nationalist Mobilization," Comparative Politics, 32 (April 2000), 295-316.
73. See, for example, comments by then-Russian Federation speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov in Nezavisimaia gazeta, Nov. 22, 1991, p. 3.
74. Sergei Kondrashov, Nationalism and the Drive for Sovereignty in Tatarstan, 1988-1992 (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 100-5.
75. Shaimiev sided with the organizers of the August 1991 coup, to the consternation of the Yeltsin camp. Yeltsin sent an emissary to Kazan later that fall to preside over Shaimiev's dismissal, but popular and parliamentary support overcame the attempt to remove him.
76. Steven Solnick, "Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 171-205.
77. Federal authorities restricted pipeline access in 1993, for example, to put pressure on the republic. Emil Pain, Moskovskie novosti, June 5-12, 1994, p. A5. They also restricted access in 1998 to pressure the republic oil giant Tatneft (and other oil majors) over taxes. Kommersant', July 2, 1998, p. 2, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 50 (July 29, 1998), 14. There was additional talk of cutting access in 1999 in response to Shaimiev's collaboration with other regional officials on a new national party. Novaia vecherka (Kazan'), July 30, 1999, p. 1.
78. Federal authorities restricted pipeline access in 1993, for example, to put pressure on the republic. Emil Pain, Moskovskie novosti, June 5-12, 1994, p. A5. They also restricted access in 1998 to pressure the republic oil giant Tatneft (and other oil majors) over taxes. Kommersant', July 2, 1998, p. 2, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 50 (July 29, 1998), 14. There was additional talk of cutting access in 1999 in response to Shaimiev's collaboration with other regional officials on a new national party. Novaia vecherka (Kazan'), July 30, 1999, p. 1.
79. Federal authorities restricted pipeline access in 1993, for example, to put pressure on the republic. Emil Pain, Moskovskie novosti, June 5-12, 1994, p. A5. They also restricted access in 1998 to pressure the republic oil giant Tatneft (and other oil majors) over taxes. Kommersant', July 2, 1998, p. 2, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 50 (July 29, 1998), 14. There was additional talk of cutting access in 1999 in response to Shaimiev's collaboration with other regional officials on a new national party. Novaia vecherka (Kazan'), July 30, 1999, p. 1.
80. Federal authorities restricted pipeline access in 1993, for example, to put pressure on the republic. Emil Pain, Moskovskie novosti, June 5-12, 1994, p. A5. They also restricted access in 1998 to pressure the republic oil giant Tatneft (and other oil majors) over taxes. Kommersant', July 2, 1998, p. 2, in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 50 (July 29, 1998), 14. There was additional talk of cutting access in 1999 in response to Shaimiev's collaboration with other regional officials on a new national party. Novaia vecherka (Kazan'), July 30, 1999, p. 1.
81. Mikhail Alexseev, "Russia's Periphery in the Global Arena: Do Regions Matter in the Kremlin's Foreign Policy?," PONARS Policy Memo, 156 (November 2000).
82. Guboglo, pp. 247-52.
83. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5; Filippov and Shvetsova, pp. 61-76; Ekho stolitsy (Yakutsk), June 9, 2000, p. 3; "History and Present of Sakha Republic," http://ngo.sitc.ru/nll/sakha/history.html.
84. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5; Filippov and Shvetsova, pp. 61-76; Ekho stolitsy (Yakutsk), June 9, 2000, p. 3; "History and Present of Sakha Republic," http://ngo.sitc.ru/nll/sakha/history.html.
85. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5; Filippov and Shvetsova, pp. 61-76; Ekho stolitsy (Yakutsk), June 9, 2000, p. 3; "History and Present of Sakha Republic," http://ngo.sitc.ru/nll/sakha/history.html.
86. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5; Filippov and Shvetsova, pp. 61-76; Ekho stolitsy (Yakutsk), June 9, 2000, p. 3; "History and Present of Sakha Republic," http://ngo.sitc.ru/nll/sakha/history.html.
87. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5.
88. I b i d.
89. Poliarnyi krug v yakutii, Dec. 1, 2000, p. 16. The decree set up a new joint stock company, Alrosa, the majority of whose shares were under the control of republic and local authorities in Sakha.
90. Daniel Kempton, "Budgetary Politics in the Russian Federation: The Case of Sakha (Yakutia)," International Journal of Public Administration, 22 (1999), 1345-85.
91. See, for example, Rossiiskaia gazeta, July 11, 1996, in FBIS-SOV 96-157-s.
92. See, for example, Segodnya, May 16, 1997, pp. 1, 6; and Izvestiia, May 16, 1997, p. 2; both reprinted in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 49 (1997), 7-9. One of the key questions was about revenues from the diamond "markup." The money had been channeled to off-budget funds under Nikolaev's direct control, and the disposition of the funds remains in dispute.
93. See, for example, Segodnya, May 16, 1997, pp. 1, 6; and Izvestiia, May 16, 1997, p. 2; both reprinted in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 49 (1997), 7-9. One of the key questions was about revenues from the diamond "markup." The money had been channeled to off-budget funds under Nikolaev's direct control, and the disposition of the funds remains in dispute.
94. See, for example, Segodnya, May 16, 1997, pp. 1, 6; and Izvestiia, May 16, 1997, p. 2; both reprinted in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 49 (1997), 7-9. One of the key questions was about revenues from the diamond "markup." The money had been channeled to off-budget funds under Nikolaev's direct control, and the disposition of the funds remains in dispute.
95. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5; Il-tumen (Yakutsk), Mar. 23, 2001, p. 17.
96. Tuimaada Sonata (Yakutsk), Oct. 20, 2000, pp. 4-5; Il-tumen (Yakutsk), Mar. 23, 2001, p. 17.
97. Interviews, Mirnyi, June 2000; Yakutsk, June 2001.
98. Interviews, Yakutsk, June 2001. One reason, as Steve Solnick notes, was a three-way battle over renewal of Russia's diamond marketing agreement with DeBeers. See Steven Solnick, "Russia between States and Markets: Transnational and Subnational Pressures in the Transition," http://www.columbia.edu/~sls27/Content/CV/SokiickGlob3.PDF.
99. Katherine Graney, "Projecting Sovereignty in Post-Soviet Russia: Tatarstan in the International Arena," in Michael Keating and John McGarry, eds., Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 264-94.
100. Harry Broadman and Francesca Recanatini, "Where Has All the Foreign Investment Gone in Russia?" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Working Paper 2640, July 2001), pp. 9-10. This discussion refers to foreign direct investment and excludes loans.
101. One indication is that the republic accounted for 2.9 percent of Russia's gross regional product (in 1997), but only 0.6 percent of its foreign direct investment (in 1995-99). Ibid.
102. I b i d.
103. V. N. Lysenko and V A. Matveev, "Rol' sub"ektivnogo faktora v provedenii ekonomicheskikh reform v regionakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii," in V. N. Lysenko and V. N. Podprigory, eds., Ekonomicheskie reformy v regionakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: Institut sovremennoi politiki, 1998), pp. 96-110.
104. Kahn, pp. 178-79.
105. Aleksandr Lebed became governor of Krasnoyarsk after his split with Yeltsin. The leaders of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan had formed a national party to contest the 1999 Duma election. Steve Solnick, "Methods of Central Control over Russia's Provinces, and Prospects for the Future," PONARS Memo, 97 (1999).
106. Gordon Hahn, "Putin's 'Federal Revolution': The Administrative and Judicial Reform of Russian Federalism," East European Constitutional Review, 10 (Winter 2001).
107. Orttung reports, for example, that as of 2001 the federal government took 100 percent of the value-added tax - an 11 percent shift of Russia's tax revenues.
108. See, for example, Novaia vecherka (Kazan'), Oct. 19, 1999, p. 1.
109. Lynn Nelson and Irina Kuzes, "Regional Variations in the Implementation of Russia's Federal District Reform," Demokratizatsiya, 10 (Winter 2002), 5-18.
110. Deputies challenged the executive branch over everything from municipal self-government to the budget and disposition of extrabudgetary funds. By some accounts, they were reacting to Nikolaev's loss of access in Moscow during Yeltsin's second term. They also seemed to be reacting to Nikolaev's habit of making decisions unilaterally.
111. Zvezda povohhia (Kazan'), Mar. 30-Apr. 5, 2000, p. 1; interviews, Kazan', February 2002.
112. Zvezda povohhia (Kazan'), Mar. 30-Apr. 5, 2000, p. 1; interviews, Kazan', February 2002.
113. Respublika Tatarstan (Kazan'), June 6, 2000, p. 1.
114. I b i d.
115. Interviews, Kazan', June 2002.
116. I b i d.
117. The process was slow, however. As of spring 2003 prosecutors were still challenging other parts of the republic constitution and laws, such as those dealing with republic citizenship. But the key elements of the republic's claim to sovereignty had been written out of its constitution.
118. Interviews, Yakutsk, June 2001.
119. Yakutsk segodnya, Nov. 1, 2000, p. 2.
120. Interviews, Yakutsk, July 2002. One indicator was that the diamond quota for 2002 was approved in January. Moscow Interfax in English, February 7, 2002, in FBIS_SOV 2002-0207. Republic officials also reported that federal funding for northern shipments arrived in advance of the shipping season for the first time in recent memory.