A computational analysis of bundle trading markets design for distributed resource allocation

Information Systems Research

Volumn 23, Issue 3 PART 1, 2012, Pages 823-843

  Guo, Zhiling ^a   Koehler, Gary J ^b   Whinston, Andrew B ^c  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational experiment; Electronic commerce; Electronic markets and auctions; Resource allocation; Simulation

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; COSTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; ITERATIVE METHODS; ONLINE SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATION; COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS; COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT; DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE ALLOCATION; ELECTRONIC MARKETS AND AUCTIONS; EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION; OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHMS; SIMULATION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84871475600     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1110.0366     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. Adomavicius, G., A. Gupta. 2005. Toward comprehensive real-time bidder support in iterative combinatorial auctions. Inform. Systems Res. 16(2) 169-185.
2. Albrecht, M. 2009. Supply chain coordination mechanisms: New approaches for collaborative planning. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 1st ed. Springer, New York.
3. Amihud, Y., H. Mendelson. 1980. Dealership market: Market making with inventory. J. Financial Econom. 8(1) 31-53.
4. Ausubel, L. M. 2004. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(5) 1452-1475.
5. Ba, S., J. Stallaert, A. B. Whinston. 2001a. Research commentary: Introducing a third dimension in information systems design- The case for incentive alignment. Inform. Systems Res. 12(3) 225-239.
6. Ba, S., J. Stallaert, A. B. Whinston. 2001b. Optimal investment in knowledge within a firm using a market mechanism. Management Sci. 47(9) 1203-1219.
7. Bertsekas, D. P. 1979. A distributed algorithm for the assignment problem. MIT Lab, Information and Decision Systems Report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
8. Bertsekas, D. P. 1988. The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem. Ann. Oper. Res. 14 105-123.
9. Bertsekas, D. P., J. N. Tsitsiklis. 1997. Introduction to Linear Optimization. Athena Scientific, Belmont, MA.
10. Bichler, M., P. Shabalin, A. Pikovsky. 2009. A computational analysis of linear price iterative combinatorial auction formats. Inform. Systems Res. 20(1) 33-59.
11. Bikhchandani, S., J. W. Mamer. 1997. Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibles. J. Econom. Theory 74(2) 385-413.
12. Bikhchandani, S., J. M. Ostroy. 2002. The package assignment model. J. Econom. Theory 107(2) 337-406.
13. Chu, L. Y. 2009. Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions. Management Sci. 55(7) 1184-1198.
14. Cramton, P. 1997. The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment. J. Econom. Management Strategy 6(3) 431-495.
15. Cramton, P., Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg. 2006. Combinatorial Auctions. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
16. Dantzig, G. B., P. Wolfe. 1960. The decomposition principle for linear programs. Oper. Res. 8(1) 101-111.
17. Demange, G., D. Gale, M. Sotomayor. 1986. Multi-item auctions. J. Political Econom. 94(4) 863-872.
18. De Vries, S., J. Schummer, R. Vohra. 2007. On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects. J. Econom. Theory 132(1) 95-118.
19. Fan, M., J. Stallaert, A. B. Whinston. 2003. Decentralized mechanism design for supply chain organizations using auction market. Inform. Systems Res. 14(1) 1-22.
20. Friedman, D., S. Sunder. 1994. Experimental Methods: A Premier for Economists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
21. Gallien, J., L. M. Wein. 2005. A smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints. Management Sci. 51(1) 76-91.
22. Guo, Z., G. J. Koehler, A. B. Whinston. 2007. A market-based optimization algorithm for distributed systems. Management Sci. 53(8) 1345-1358.
23. Harris, L. 2002. Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
24. Hogan, W. W., E. G. Read, B. J. Ring. 1996. Using mathematical programming for electricity spot pricing. Internat. Trans. Oper. Res. 3(3-4) 209-221.
25. Kelso, A. S., V. P. Crawford. 1982. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica 50(6) 1483-1504.
26. Kothari, A., T. Sandholm, S. Suri. 2004. Solving combinatorial exchanges: Optimality via a few partial bids. Proc. Third Internat. Joint Conf. Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'04), Vol. 3, New York.
27. Leonard, H. B. 1983. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions. J. Political Econom. 91(3) 461-479.
28. Lubin, B., A. I. Juda, R. Cavallo, S. Lahaie, J. Shneidman, D. C. Parkes. 2008. ICE: An expressive iterative combinatorial exchange. J. Artificial Intelligence Res. 33 33-77.
29. Makridakis, S. G., S. C. Wheelwright, V. E. McGee. 1983. Forecasting. John Wiley & Sons Inc., Hoboken, NJ.
30. Marschak, T. 2006. Organization structure. T. Hendershott, ed. Handbooks in Information Systems, Vol. 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 201-284.
31. Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
32. McAfee, R. P. 1991. Efficient allocation with continuous quantities. J. Econom. Theory 53(1) 51-74.
33. McAfee, R. P. 1992. A dominant strategy double auction. J. Econom. Theory 56(2) 434-450.
34. McCabe, K., S. Rassenti, V. Smith. 1990. Auction design for composite goods: The natural gas industry. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 14(9) 127-149.
35. McCabe, K., S. Rassenti, V. Smith. 1991. Smart computer-assisted markets. Science 254(5031) 534-538.
36. Meeus, L., K. Verhaegen, R. Belmans. 2009. Block order restrictions in combinatorial electric energy auctions. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 196(3) 1202-1206.
37. Myerson, R. B., M. A. Satterthwaite. 1983. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J. Econom. Theory 29(2) 265-281.
38. Nisan, N., A. Ronen. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35(1/2) 166-196.
39. O'Hara, M. 1995. Market Microstructure Theory. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA.
40. Parkes, D. C. 1999. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. Proc. ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce, ACM Press, New York, 148-157.
41. Parkes, D. C. 2006. Iterative combinatorial auctions. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, eds. Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 2. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 41-78.
42. Parkes, D. C., L. H. Ungar. 2000. Iterative combinational auctions: Theory and practice. 17th National Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 74-81.
43. Pekec, A., M. H. Rothkopf. 2003. Combinatorial auction design. Management Sci. 49(11) 1485-1503.
44. Raffensperger, J. F., W. M. Mark, E. G. Read. 2009. A deterministic smart market model for ground water. Oper. Res. 57(6) 1333-1346.
45. Rassenti, S. J., V. L. Smith, R. L. Bluffing. 1982. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. Econom. 13(2) 402-417.
46. Roberts, S. W. 1959. Control chart tests based on geometric moving averages. Technometrics 1 239-250.
47. Rothkopf, M. H. 2007. Thirteen reasons why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process is not practical. Oper. Res. 55(2) 191-197.
48. Rothkopf, M. H., A. Pekec, R. M. Harstad. 1998. Computationally manageable combinational auctions. Management Sci. 44(8) 1131-1147.
49. Sandholm, T., C. Boutilier. 2006. Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, eds. Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 10. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
50. Scheffel, T., A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, K. Guler. 2010. An experimental comparison of linear and nonlinear price combinatorial auctions. Inform. Systems Res. 22(2) 346-368.
51. Shapley, L. S., M. Shubik. 1972. The assignment game I: The core. Internat. J. Game Theory 1(1) 111-130.
52. Sheffi, Y. 2004. Combinatorial auctions in the procurement of transportation services. Interfaces 34(4) 245-252.
53. Thomas, P., D. Teneketzis, J. K. Mackie-Mason. 2002. A marketbased approach to optimal resource allocation in integratedservices connection-oriented networks. Oper. Res. 50(4) 603-616.
54. Xia, M., J. Stallaert, A. B. Whinston. 2005. Solving the combinatorial double auction problem. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 164(1) 239-251.