A smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 76-91

  Gallien, Jérémie ^a   Wein, Lawrence M ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Best response; Iterative bidding mechanism; Procurement auctions; Smart markets

Indexed keywords

BEST RESPONSE; ITERATIVE BIDDING MECHANISM; PROCUREMENT AUCTION; SMART MARKETS;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONTRACTS; COSTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INVENTORY CONTROL; ONLINE SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION;

MARKETING;

EID: 13844255203     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0230     Document Type: Article

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