Thirteen reasons why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process is not practical

Operations Research

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 191-197

  Rothkopf, Michael H ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Mechanism design; Truth revealing strategies

Indexed keywords

MECHANISM DESIGN; TRUTH-REVEALING STRATEGIES; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES PROCESS;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; NUMERICAL METHODS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 34247522452     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1070.0384     Document Type: Article

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