Solving combinatorial exchanges: Optimality via a few partial bids

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 3, Issue , 2004, Pages 1418-1419

  Kothari, Anshul ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b   Suri, Subhash ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; BIDDERS; COMBINATORIAL EXCHANGE; MARKETPLACES;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COSTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INTERNET; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; MARKETING; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SALES; THEOREM PROVING;

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS;

EID: 4544228830     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (4)

1. K. Leyton-Brown Y. Fujishima and Y. Shoham. Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. IJCAI, 1999.
2. A. Pekec M. H. Rothkopf and R. M. Harstad. Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. In Management Science, volume 44, pages 1131-1147, 1998.
3. T. Sandholm and S. Suri. Improved algorithms for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artificial Intelligence, 145:33-58.
4. T. Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135:1-54, January 2002.