Reputation and uncertainty in online markets: An experimental study

Information Systems Research

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 436-452

  Rice, Sarah C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Online markets; Reputation systems

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INVESTMENTS; SALES;

BUYERS AND SELLERS; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; MARKET PARTICIPANTS; ONLINE MARKETS; PURCHASE DECISION; REPUTATION MECHANISM; REPUTATION RATING; REPUTATION SYSTEMS;

ONLINE SYSTEMS;

EID: 84870587872     PISSN: 10477047     EISSN: 15265536     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/isre.1110.0362     Document Type: Article

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