Motivating Innovation

Journal of Finance

Volumn 66, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1823-1860

  Manso, Gustavo ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052687117     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x     Document Type: Article

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