Contests with rank-order spillovers

Economic Theory

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 315-350

  Baye, Michael R ^a   Kovenock, Dan ^b   de Vries, Casper G ^c  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^c ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Auctions; Contests; Spillovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866756627     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0489-2     Document Type: Article

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