Comparative analysis of litigation systems: An auction-the oretic approach

Economic Journal

Volumn 115, Issue 505, 2005, Pages 583-601

  Baye, Michael R ^a   Kovenock, Dan ^a   De Vries, Casper G ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEGISLATION;

EID: 28144463205     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01010.x     Document Type: Article

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