Innovative activity and sunk cost

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 8, 2003, Pages 1111-1133

  Kaplan, Todd R ^a   Luski, Israel ^b   Wettstein, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

All pay auctions; Innovation; R D; Races; Sunk costs

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COSTS; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY; STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING;

INNOVATION;

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0043016021     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00033-X     Document Type: Article

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