Auctions with cross-shareholdings

Economic Theory

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 163-194

  Dasgupta, Sudipto ^a   Tsui, Kevin ^b  

^a HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bidding; Cross shareholdings; Revenue equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942705946     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y     Document Type: Article

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