Auctions with financial externalities

Economic Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 551-574

  Maasland, Emiel ^a   Onderstal, Sander ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Auctions; Financial externalities; Reserve price

Indexed keywords

EID: 34347222909     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0119-1     Document Type: Article

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