A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 263-272

  Dughmi, Shaddin ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

algorithmic mechanism design; combinatorial public projects

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION FACTOR; COMPUTATIONAL CONSTRAINTS; CONSTANT FACTOR APPROXIMATION; NP-HARD; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; PUBLIC PROJECT; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM; RESOURCE CONSTRAINT; SOCIAL WELFARE; SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS;

ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; CONVEX OPTIMIZATION; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 79959592600     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993574.1993614     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (30)

1. A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski. Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization: Analysis, Algorithms, and Engineering Applications. SIAM, 2001.
2. S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe. Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
3. D. Buchfuhrer, S. Dughmi, H. Fu, R. Kleinberg, E. Mossel, C. Papadimitriou, M. Schapira, Y. Singer, and C. Umans. Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 21st ACM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2010.
4. D. Buchfuhrer, M. Schapira, and Y. Singer. Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects. In Proc. 12th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2010.
5. G. Calinescu, C. Chekuri, M. Pál, and J. Vondrák. Maximizing a submodular set function subject to a matroid constraint. In Proc. 12th Intl. Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (IPCO), 2007.
6. S. Dobzinski. Two randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 10th Intl. Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2007.
7. S. Dobzinski. An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. In Proceedings of the 43rd annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2011.
8. S. Dobzinski and S. Dughmi. On the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design. In Proc. 50th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2009.
9. S. Dobzinski, H. Fu, and R. Kleinberg. Truthfulness via proxies. CoRR, abs/1011.3232, 2010.
10. S. Dobzinski and N. Nisan. Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. In Proc. 38th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2007.
11. S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, and M. Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. In Proc. 36th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2005.
12. S. Dobzinski, N. Nisan, and M. Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 37th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2006.
13. S. Dobzinski and M. Schapira. An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. In Proc. 17th ACM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2006.
14. S. Dobzinski and M. Sundararajan. On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. In Proc. 10th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2008.
15. S. Dughmi and T. Roughgarden. Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design. In Proc. 51st IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2010.
16. S. Dughmi, T. Roughgarden, and M. Sundararajan. Revenue submodularity. In Proc. 11th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2009.
17. S. Dughmi, T. Roughgarden, and Q. Yan. From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: Toward optimal combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 43rd annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2011.
18. U. Feige. On maximizing welfare where the utility functions are subadditive. In Proc. 37th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2006.
19. U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, and J. Vondrák. Maximizing non-monotone submodular functions. In Proc. 48th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2007.
20. R. Lavi and C. Swamy. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In Proc. 46th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2005.
21. G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, and M. L. Fisher. An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions - I. Mathematical Programming, 14(3), 1978.
22. N. Nisan. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists). In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
23. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. In Proc. 40th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 1999.
24. N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Computationally feasible VCG-based mechanisms. In Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2000.
25. N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
26. J. G. Oxley. Matroid Theory. Oxford University Press, 1992.
27. C. Papadimitriou, M. Schapira, and Y. Singer. On the hardness of being truthful. In Proc. 49th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2008.
28. R. Raz and S. Safra. A sub-constant error-probability low-degree test, and a sub-constant error-probability pcp characterization of np. In Proc. 29th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 1997.
29. A. Schrijver. Combinatorial Optimization. Springer, 2003.
30. J. Vondrák. Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model. In Proc. 39th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2008.