Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions

Algorithmica (New York)

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 3-18

  Khot, Subhash ^a   Lipton, Richard J ^a,b   Markakis, Evangelos ^c   Mehta, Aranyak ^d  

^a GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b TELCORDIA TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^d IBM ALMADEN RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Hardness of approximation; Social welfare; Submodular

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION PROBLEMS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; HARDNESS OF APPROXIMATION; INAPPROXIMABILITY; POLYNOMIAL-TIME APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; PROOF SYSTEMS; SOCIAL WELFARE; SUBMODULAR; SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMMERCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; NUCLEAR PROPULSION; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

SET THEORY;

EID: 49149102694     PISSN: 01784617     EISSN: 14320541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-007-9105-7     Document Type: Conference Paper

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