Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 453-460

  Sanver, M Remzi ^a  

^a ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Maskin monotonicity; Mechanism design; Nash implementation; No veto power

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344454354     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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