Evidence disclosure and verifiability

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 118, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-31

  Bull, Jesse ^a   Watson, Joel ^b  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Contracts; Evidence disclosure; External enforcement; Implementation; Verifiability

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344587427     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.002     Document Type: Article

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