Behavioral aspects of implementation theory

Economics Letters

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 161-164

  Matsushima, Hitoshi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Detail freeness; Implementation theory; Possibility theorem; White lie aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949121757     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.008     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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8. Maskin E., and Sjöström T. Implementation theory. In: Arrow K., Sen A., and Suzumura K. (Eds). Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare vol. 1 (2002), Elsevier
9. Matsushima, in press. Role of Honesty in Full Implementation. Journal of Economic Theory.
10. Moore J. Implementation in environments with complete information. In: Laffont J.J. (Ed). Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress (1992), Cambridge University Press
11. Osborne M., and Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory (1994), MIT Press