Ex post implementation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 527-566

  Bergemann, Dirk ^a   Morris, Stephen ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ex post equilibrium; Implementation; Interdependent values; Single crossing

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649180491     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006     Document Type: Article

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