Using laboratory experiments to build better operations management models

Foundations and Trends in Technology, Information and Operations Management

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 1-88

  Katok, Elena ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS; OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT;

LABORATORIES;

EXPERIMENTS;

EID: 84861833064     PISSN: 15719545     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1561/0200000022     Document Type: Article

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