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Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 247-272

Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions

Author keywords

Auctions; Experiments; Quantal response; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords


EID: 0036275062     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2914     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (267)

References (36)
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    • 0003482631 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Semiparametric Estimation of First Price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders"
    • Discussion Paper, University of Southern California
    • (2000)
    • Campo, S.1    Perrigne, I.2    Vuong, Q.3
  • 13
  • 18
    • 85031453947 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Does Repetition Improve Consistency?"
    • Discussion Paper Universities of York and Bari
    • (1999)
    • Hey, J.D.1
  • 20
    • 85031457343 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • "Naive Bidding and the Winner's Curse in Auctions with Independent Common Value Components"
    • discussion paper presented at the 1995 CREED Conference on Experimental Economics
    • (1997) Amsterdam
    • Holt, C.A.1    Sherman, R.2
  • 30
    • 0009941386 scopus 로고
    • Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
    • (1994) Games Econ. Behav , vol.10 , pp. 202-217
    • Ochs, J.1
  • 32
    • 0001006304 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Risk aversion and expected utility theory
    • (2000) Econometrica , vol.68 , Issue.5 , pp. 1281-1292
    • Rabin, M.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.