Entrepreneurship and organization design

European Economic Review

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 888-902

  Roessler, Christian ^a   Koellinger, Philipp ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

D20; Entrepreneurship; J24; J31; L23; L26; Organization design; Profits; Wages

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT; ENTREPRENEUR; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; MODEL TEST; MODEL VALIDATION; OCCUPATION; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; PROFITABILITY; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EID: 84860590916     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.02.014     Document Type: Article

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