Corrigendum to “Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities” [J. Econ. Theory 70 (1996) 93–108, (S0022053196900770), (10.1006/jeth.1996.0077)];Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 93-108

  Sasaki, Hiroo ^a   Toda, Manabu ^b  

^a WASEDA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b TOKYO KEIZAI UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030188407     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105547     Document Type: Erratum

References (20)

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