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Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 75, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 464-475
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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EID: 0000132827     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2291     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (72)
References (6)
  • 1
    • 0000205687 scopus 로고
    • Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
    • Crawford V., Knoer E. M. Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers. Econometrica. 49:1981;437-450.
    • (1981) Econometrica , vol.49 , pp. 437-450
    • Crawford, V.1    Knoer, E.M.2
  • 2
    • 0003165311 scopus 로고
    • College admissions and the stability of marriage
    • Gale D., Shapley L. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly. 69:1962;9-15.
    • (1962) Amer. Math. Monthly , vol.69 , pp. 9-15
    • Gale, D.1    Shapley, L.2
  • 3
    • 0001321021 scopus 로고
    • Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes
    • Kelso A., Crawford V. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica. 50:1982;1483-1504.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 1483-1504
    • Kelso, A.1    Crawford, V.2
  • 4
    • 0001159517 scopus 로고
    • The economics of matching: Stability and incentives
    • Roth A. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Math. Oper. Res. 7:1982;617-628.
    • (1982) Math. Oper. Res. , vol.7 , pp. 617-628
    • Roth, A.1
  • 5
    • 46549091119 scopus 로고
    • The college admission problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
    • Roth A. The college admission problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. J. Econ. Theory. 36:1985;277-288.
    • (1985) J. Econ. Theory , vol.36 , pp. 277-288
    • Roth, A.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.