Job Matching and Coalition Formation with Utility or Disutility of Co-workers

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 83-103

  Ma, Jinpeng ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042334875     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0791     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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